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INTRODUCTION
The federal government and local governments have historically
tied housing affordability requirements to subsidies designed to
promote affordable housing development. In the first half of the 20th
century, the federal government promoted affordable housing
development through the Public Housing program, which was
publicly financed, owned, and managed.1 With the creation of the

*
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David Schleicher, and Jeff Lubell for their feedback on drafts of the paper.
1. According to the National Housing Law Project, “[t]he United States Housing
Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437) established the public housing program, which
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U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the
1960s, the federal government moved toward programs and incentives
that promoted private sector ownership and management of
subsidized affordable housing units.2 Through these programs,
owners commit to maintaining affordable units for fixed periods of
time in exchange for subsidies.3 But because some owners choose to
exit private sector programs after the affordability restriction periods
end, it remains unclear what the mandated length of these
affordability restriction periods should be.4
In light of recent housing affordability challenges, housing
advocates have increased calls for “permanent affordability”
requirements on housing developments that receive any form of
public subsidy.5
Permanent affordability means mandating
affordability restrictions on a property, or the land on which it is
developed, that run in perpetuity — unless the governing agency
agrees to release the property from its affordability contract. This
Article discusses the role and length of such affordability restrictions,

produced nearly 1.4 million units nationwide.” See Public Housing, NAT’L HOUSING
L.
PROJECT,
https://www.nhlp.org/resource-center/public-housing/
[https://perma.cc/YLB2-K6CL] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
2. See generally JACLENE BEGLEY ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW
YORK
CITY’S
SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING:
2011
(2011),
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/SHIPReportFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4VP-VYAR]. The Furman Center found that one byproduct of
this shift has been the continual loss of guaranteed affordable units to subsidy
expirations. Id. at 9–10. Between 1962 and 2010, New York City lost over 62,000 units
that had been subsidized through HUD financing and insurance, HUD project-based
rental assistance, the Mitchell-Lama program, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.
Id. at 19. Going forward, this Article uses “affordable housing” to refer to all units
with below market-rate rents, which includes those with a subsidy. In addition, this
Article uses “subsidized affordable housing” to refer to units with below market-rate
rents due to a public subsidy and the accompanying affordability restriction tied to it.
3. See ALEX SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 203–26 (3d
ed. 2015).
4. BEGLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 19. For a review of studies on the effects of
affordability restrictions after the time periods elapsed, see Jake Blumgart, Have We
Been Wasting Affordable Housing Money?, SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://shelterforce.org/2016/02/04/have_we_been_wasting_affordable_housing_mone
y/ [https://perma.cc/RM2T-BJ8U].
5. See generally BENJAMIN DULCHIN, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. DEV.,
PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS (2015),
https://anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-Permanent-Affordability-PracticalSolutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFF6-K9D5]. “Permanently affordable” housing is
any housing that, when it receives a public subsidy or tax incentives, or is built using
public land, must maintain affordable rents or homeownership for the full duration of
its existence. See, e.g., id. at 4.
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and the potential benefits and challenges associated with mandating
permanent affordability.
Part I of this Article outlines the current housing affordability
problems. Part II then describes where the preservation of subsidized
affordable housing sits among other policy responses aimed at
addressing current housing affordability problems. Part III defines
the concept of “permanent affordability” and Part IV highlights the
opportunities and challenges associated with mandating it. Finally,
Part V explores the policy implications of a permanent affordability
mandate, and Part VI concludes that permanent affordability
mandates can be an effective tool in addressing housing affordability
in some contexts.
I. THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGE
There is a plethora of research evaluating the scale and nature of
the current national housing affordability problem. Most of this
research assesses the severity of housing cost burdens, which is the
share of household income spent on housing.6 This research points to
two distinct realities. First, the level of rent burdens, particularly
those faced by the lowest-income households, have escalated
dramatically nationwide.7 Second, the existing inventory of housing
affordable to the lowest-income households is small and shrinking.8

6. Rental Burdens: Rethinking Affordability Measures, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING &
URBAN
DEV.,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_092214.html
[https://perma.cc/DAG2-TA8D] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). HUD defines rentburdened families as those “who pay more than 30 percent of their income for
housing” and who may, as a result, “have difficulty affording necessities such as food,
clothing, transportation, and medical care.” Id.
7. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S
HOUSING
5
(2018),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations
_Housing_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8QA-AXBE]. “The cost-burdened share of
renters doubled from 23.8 percent in the 1960s to 47.5 percent in 2016 as housing
costs and household incomes steadily diverged, with the largest increases occurring in
the 2000s.” Id.
8. The Joint Center for Housing Studies found that “[t]he nation’s supply of lowcost rental housing shrank significantly after the Great Recession and has remained
essentially unchanged since 2015 . . . . [M]ore than 2.5 million units priced below $800
in real terms — affordable to households earning up to $32,000 per year — were lost
on net between 1990 and 2016.” Id. at 28.
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In 2017, nearly 31% of all households and 46% of renter households
spent over 30% of their income on rent.9 According to HUD,
households that spend over 30% of their income on housing are
housing cost burdened.10 The situation is far worse for low-income
households. In 2017, over 88% of U.S. renters with household
incomes less than $20,000 were rent burdened, whereas only under
1% of households in this bracket spent less than 20% of their income
on rent.11 Further, nearly half of all renters suffer from excessive rent
burdens.12 The impact of rent burden is not limited to a particular
market, with households in both high-cost markets and relatively lowcost markets carrying high levels of rent burden.13 Moreover, while
the effects of rent burden are not new, research shows that between
2000 and 2010, the extent of these burdens increased dramatically
because increases in rent far outpaced income growth.14 By 2010,
almost every Metropolitan Statistical Area (“MSA”) in the United
States reported higher rent burdens than it had ten years earlier.15

9. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
(ACS)
1-YEAR
ESTIMATES
(2017),
https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/data/summary-file.html [https://perma.cc/M888-L9YH].
10. MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN
AFFORD TO LIVE IN A HOME?: A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2007).
11. VINCENT REINA, UNIV. OF PA WHARTON PUB. POLICY INITIATIVE, THE U.S.
NEEDS
A
NATIONAL
VISION
FOR
HOUSING
POLICY
64
(2019),
https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/314-a
[https://perma.cc/BRX7U6XS].
12. John Landis & Vincent Reina, Eleven Ways Demographic and Economic
Change is Reframing American Housing Policy, 29 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 4, 12
(2019). The American Housing Act of 1949 established 25% as the maximum share of
their income that American households should pay for housing; this was raised to
30% in 1973. Id. Any percentage in excess of 30% is deemed excess housing cost
burden. Id.
13. In addition to high-rent states like California, New York, and Massachusetts,
the list of states with the highest shares of excessively burdened renters includes lessexpensive states such as Louisiana, Mississippi, and West Virginia. Id. The same is
also true of metro areas: the list of metro areas with proportionally more costburdened renters includes the usual suspects such as Los Angeles and Washington,
D.C., but also less-expensive markets such as Orlando and Richmond. Id.
14. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., supra note 7, at 5.
15. See HEATHER L. SCHWARTZ ET AL., RAND CORP., PRESERVATION OF
AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING: EVALUATION OF THE MACARTHUR FOUNDATION’S
WINDOW
OF
OPPORTUNITY
INITIATIVE
112
(2016),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1444.html
[https://perma.cc/8XBJP582]. The authors found that between 1990 and 2010, rents increased across most of
the 238 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. and that there was a dramatic increase
in rent burdens for households below 80% of area median income. See id. at 13
(noting that in the 1990s, rents were not rising but they did go up dramatically in
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One of the key drivers of the current affordable housing crisis is
the lack of supply of lower-cost housing units. Across the United
States, there are only 37 affordable housing units available for every
100 extremely low-income renters.16 The lack of affordable units
available to low-income renters is a national phenomenon.17 Every
MSA in the country has fewer affordable rental units available than
needed by extremely low-income households.18 A common argument
against using housing cost burdens as the only measure of housing
affordability is that people may choose to spend more on housing.19
Another critique is that some of these rent burdens are driven by an
issue with the sorting of units in most markets. The sorting issue
suggests that there are affordable units in a market but some lowincome households must rent a higher-cost unit, and thus experience
housing cost burdens, because a comparatively higher-income
household is renting the more affordable unit. As a result, it is not
that there is an insufficient number of units affordable to low-income
households in many markets, it is just that some of those units are not
available for low-income households to rent. A report published by
the RAND Corporation provided a hypothetical matching game to
test the impact of sorting on rent burdens in housing markets.20 The
RAND study ranked renters along the income distribution within
their particular MSA, then ranked all rental units in that market by
price, and finally matched each household to the rental unit that had
the same rank in the distribution.21 The study found that even when

subsequent decades). This resulted in higher levels of renter burden in almost every
MSA in the study by 2010. Id. at 112.
16. See ANDREW AURAND, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: THE
AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
SHORTAGE
3
(2019),
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3K6F-HYU4]. “Extremely low income” is defined as income at or
below the Federal Poverty Guideline or 30% of area median income, whichever is
higher. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 8.
18. The number of affordable and available units is as low as 14 for every 100
extremely low-income households in the Las Vegas MSA. Id. The MSA with the
largest number of units affordable and available to this population is Pittsburgh,
which nevertheless has only 51 units for every 100 extremely low-income households.
Id.
19. MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN
AFFORD TO LIVE IN A HOME?: A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY
SURVEY
2
(2008),
https://www.census.gov/housing/census/publications/who-can-afford.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4L6-XZ8Y].
20. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
21. Id.
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households sort themselves perfectly — meaning that if every
household was ranked on the income distribution from lowest to
highest, and if every rental unit was ranked from cheapest to most
expensive, and subsequently matched based on that rank — the
majority of low-income renters in almost every MSA in the country
would be rent burdened.22
The United States is losing more affordable rental units than those
being produced, with or without a government subsidy, in any given
year.23 This pattern will likely continue going forward considering the
inadequate supply response to the demand for rental units in many
markets.24 The lack of supply response is only increasing demand and
prices throughout the rent distribution in many markets.25 A lack of
filtering — meaning the most expensive units becoming more
affordable over time as they depreciate26 — is contributing to the
current affordability crisis. Further, due to high demand and an
inadequate supply response, some units may be “filtering up” —
meaning existing units are being upgraded, and prices are going up in
units that would traditionally filter down.27 Meanwhile, units at the

22. Id. at 10. This study and similar studies highlight a lack of available and
affordable units to low-income households across diverse housing markets. See
generally NICHOLAS CHIUMENTI, THE GROWING SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE
HOUSING FOR THE EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME IN MASSACHUSETTS (2019); JOSH
LEOPOLD ET AL., THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY GAP FOR EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME
RENTERS IN 2013 (2015); MICH. STATE HOUS. DEV. AUTH., MICHIGAN STATEWIDE
HOUSING
NEEDS
ASSESSMENT
54–77
(2019),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mshda/MSHDA-Statewide-Housing-Needsweb_653602_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNF8-UVP8].
23. What
Is
Preservation?,
NAT’L
HOUSING
TR.,
https://www.nationalhousingtrust.org/what-preservation
[https://perma.cc/FEG73KEL] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (noting that “for every new affordable apartment
created, two are lost due to deterioration, abandonment or conversion to more
expensive housing”).
24. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., supra note 7, at 5 (finding that even robust
rental construction in recent years has not stemmed the loss of affordable rental
units). Between 2006 and 2016, “the lowest-cost rental stock shrank by more than 10
percent in 153 of the nation’s 381 metros and by more than 20 percent in 89 metros”
as rental demand surged. Id.; see also Carolina K. Reid et al., Addressing California’s
Housing Shortage: Lessons from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 241, 241 (2016) (finding that the lack of new
construction in California helped push rents up 24 between 2000 and 2016).
25. Reid et al., supra note 24, at 241. According to this study, California has added
half of the number of units needed over the last three decades, and the lack of new
construction in California helped push rents up 24% between 2000 and 2016. Id.
26. For a full discussion of filtering, see George Gastler, William Grigsby and the
Analysis of Housing Sub-Markets and Filtering, 33 URB. STUD. 1797 (1996).
27. See C. Tsuriel Somerville & Christopher J. Mayer, Government Regulation
and Changes in the Affordable Housing Stock, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 45, 50 (2003); see
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very bottom of the rent distribution traditionally exit the market due
to depleted housing quality, which decreases the supply of the
cheapest units.28 In theory, these units can be recapitalized and reenter the housing supply throughout the rent distribution, but there is
clear evidence that this is not happening in many markets.29
For example, in Philadelphia, over 7000 units of affordable housing
exited the housing supply between 2014 and 2016 because their cost
increased or because they dropped out of the housing stock entirely.30
Meanwhile, the city added close to 3000 high-cost units.31 This loss of
market-rate affordable housing increased both the number of rentburdened low-income households and the level of their rent
burdens,32 and consequently increased demand for the remaining few
subsidized affordable units in Philadelphia.

also

D.C. PRES. NETWORK, MAINTAINING ECONOMIC DIVERSITY AND
AFFORDABILITY: A STRATEGY FOR PRESERVING AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING IN
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
2
(2014),
https://www.neighborhoodindicators.org/sites/default/files/publications/preservation2
0strategy20dec20141.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VTU-3YQ9]. In hot markets like
Washington, D.C., high demand for rental housing outstrips supply even at high
income levels, causing competition and rising prices. Id.
Over the last decade, DC has lost 50 percent of its low-cost housing units,
largely due to rising housing prices . . . . [N]ew housing units are being
snapped up as quickly as they are put on the market because the increased
supply has not yet caught up to the elevated demand.

Id.

28. MARK TRESKON & CARL HEDMAN, URB. INST., BUILDING AND PROTECTING
AFFORDABLE
AND
ADEQUATE
RENTAL
HOUSING
4–5
(2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98718/building_and_protecting_a
ffordable_and_adequate_rental_housing.pdf [https://perma.cc/99CF-FYAX]. In weak
markets like Detroit, the rental housing stock is under stress less because of demand
than because of lack of capital for housing repairs, deterioration, and abandonment.
Id. at 5.
29. Reid et al., supra note 24, at 241.
30. CITY OF PHILA., DEP’T OF PLANNING & DEV., HOUSING FOR EQUITY: AN
ACTION
PLAN
FOR
PHILADELPHIA
4
(2018)
https://www.phila.gov/media/20190115161305/Housing-Action-Plan-Final-forWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8U7-FZ32] [hereinafter CITY OF PHILA., HOUSING FOR
EQUITY]. According to this report, “low end” units were defined as those with rents
at or below $800. Id.
31. Defined as those containing units with rents at or above $2000. Id.
32. CITY OF PHILA., DEP’T OF PLAN. & DEV., FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE:
DEVELOPING PHILADELPHIA’S HOUSING ACTION PLAN 6 (2018) [hereinafter CITY OF
PHILA.,
FOUNDATION
FOR
THE
FUTURE],
https://www.phila.gov/media/20190124094527/Foundation-for-the-FutureDeveloping-the-HAP-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ2P-W8VB]. The combination of
a dwindling supply of low-cost units and the stagnation of wages increases the ratio of
rents to household incomes, resulting in rent burden among low-income households.
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As demand for affordable housing has increased, new threats have
emerged to the existing stock of subsidized affordable housing. Many
of the existing subsidized affordable housing units across the country
will either reach the end of their affordability restriction periods, or
require major recapitalization, over the coming decade.33
Specifically:
Over 590,000 units in Section 8 project-based rental assistance
(PBRA) properties where an owner will have the option to renew
their subsidy or exist the program; over 450,000 units in Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) properties; and 120,000 units in
HOME-financed properties where the subsidy and affordability
restrictions are due to expire over the next 10 years . . . . [M]any of
these properties will renew the subsidy, apply for a new one, or
maintain their units as affordable absent any subsidy. How many
units will remain affordable, and for how long, is unknown . . . . There
are an additional 1 million LIHTC units approaching their 15-year
disposition period over the next 10 years. While their affordability
restrictions do not expire, many of these units will need rehabilitation
as part of a normal life-cycle recapitalization.34
At the same time, publicly-owned affordable housing (“public
housing”) is also at risk. There is a consistent lack of adequate
federal funding for necessary repairs, which leads to severe
deterioration of units that affects the health and safety of tenants and
can render some units uninhabitable.35 The national backlog for
repairs is estimated to be well over $26 billion.36 At the local level,
the consequences and effects of this backlog are well documented in
the media. A recent news article claimed that 2500 units in
Washington D.C. — close to one-third of the city’s public housing
portfolio — require “urgent” attention. 37 New York City’s public
housing portfolio is also experiencing deteriorating conditions, which

33. Vincent Reina, The Preservation of Subsidized Housing: What We Know and
Need to Know 1 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper, No. WP18VR1, 2018),

https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/reina_wp18vr1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2G9-U7LP].
34. Id.
35. For a discussion of public housing’s severe capital needs, see SCHWARTZ,
supra note 3, at 178–84 (2015).
36. Reina, supra note 33, at 4.
37. See Morgan Baskin, Nearly One-Third of the City’s Public Housing Stock is at
Risk of Becoming Uninhabitable, WASH. CITY PAPER (Dec. 20, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housingcomplex/article/21038117/nearly-onethird-of-the-citys-public-housing-stock-is-at-riskof-becoming-uninhabitable [https://perma.cc/QAC5-MMYT].
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has resulted in a multitude of health-related lawsuits.38 The scale of
housing quality issues in public housing presents a challenge:
policymakers will increasingly need to decide whether to use existing
subsidies to develop new subsidized affordable housing or reinvest in
the viability and affordability of existing subsidized housing.
This Part has highlighted a potent affordable housing challenge.
The question then becomes whether, when, and how a permanent
affordability mandate would address some of the factors affecting
housing affordability.
II. POLICY RESPONSES
The current affordability crisis requires a multi-pronged policy
response. Many researchers and practitioners agree that there is no
one solution to the current challenges.39 Instead, a suite of responses
must be adopted simultaneously.40 These responses often revolve
around three main topics: (1) increasing the supply of housing,
including those that are market rate and those that enter the market
at a lower price point, and are thus affordable to low-income
households; (2) preserving the supply and quality of existing
affordable housing, including units with and without government
subsidies; and (3) protecting low-income households from

38. There are various media reports about the housing conditions, with some
specifically focusing on lead exposure. See, e.g., J. David Goodman et al., Tests Show
Children Were Exposed to Lead. The Official Response: Challenge the Tests, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/18/nyregion/nycha-leadpaint.html [https://perma.cc/M5AT-F89H]. Others focus more broadly on issues of
housing quality and inhabitability. See, e.g., Nicole Greenfield, Inside NYC’s Public
Housing, Mold and Neglect Are a Dangerous Combo, NAT’L RESOURCE DEF.
COUNCIL (June 25, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/inside-nycs-public-housingmold-and-neglect-are-dangerous-combo [https://perma.cc/5TYJ-EET2].
39. See Emily Badger, How to Make Expensive Cities Affordable for Everyone
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
19,
2016),
Again,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/19/how-to-make-expensivecities-affordable-for-everyone-again [https://perma.cc/A42Y-C98L] (discussing the
response of various economists, sociologists, and land-use scholars to the question of
what happens to housing affordability when non-subsidized housing supply is
increased).
40. See Jeffrey Lubell, Preserving and Expanding Affordability in Neighborhoods
Experiencing Rising Rents and Property Values, 18 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES.
131, 132 (2016) (highlighting the need for local governments to focus on six housing
strategies: (1) preservation of existing affordable rental units; (2) protections that
help long-term residents remain in place; (3) inclusive housing programs that
promote mixed-income developments; (4) revenue generation from growth that gets
repurposed as a resource for affordable housing; (5) incentives for affordable
housing; and (6) the acquisition of existing affordable housing).
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displacement.41 For policymakers, the necessary balance between
new construction and preservation varies based on local market
conditions. For example, consider Philadelphia, which has an
abundant supply of lower-cost units that are uninhabitable or in need
of serious repair. The city created a ten-year action plan to develop
and preserve over 100,000 units of housing, with 63.5% of that target
focused on the preservation of existing affordable housing units.42
Conversely, Seattle has seen dramatic rent growth in recent years due
to an increase in higher-earning residents and a lack of new units
meeting that demand.43 Consequently, the city developed a plan that
aims to build or preserve 50,000 units — 60% of that target focused on
new market-rate construction, and the remaining 40% devoted either
to the development or preservation of affordable units.44
Both plans reference the preservation of private market units
currently at affordable rent levels, and the preservation of existing
subsidized housing either at risk of subsidy expiration or in need of
repair. In Philadelphia’s case, the plan explicitly mentions the nearly
14,500 units of existing subsidized housing that may need support
before the year 2030,45 whereas the Seattle plan does not specifically
mention this portfolio.46 Regardless of how explicitly cities and states
address this problem, research shows that the number of units in need
of preservation far exceeds the number of affordable housing units
being created.47 The loss of existing affordable units is central to
housing advocates’ call for mandating all properties receiving any
form of local or federal subsidy — either during the development

41. See ALLISON ALBEE ET AL., CHANGELAB SOLS., PRESERVING, PROTECTING,
EXPANDING
AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
18–30
(2015),
https://kresge.org/sites/default/files/Preserving-affordable-housing-policy-tools-April2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2LQ-732U]; Press Release, Local Initiatives Support
Corporation, Protect, Preserve and Produce: A Landmark Housing Partnership
Arrives in the Bay Area (Jan. 24, 2019), http://www.lisc.org/our-stories/story/protectpreserve-produce-landmark-housing-partnership-arrives-bay-area
[https://perma.cc/DT5S-CH9G].
42. CITY OF PHILA., HOUSING FOR EQUITY, supra note 30, at 5.
43. Mike Rosenberg, After Brief Slowdown, Seattle-Area Rents Surge Back Up
Again; When Will It End?, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017, 5:25 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/after-brief-slowdown-seattle-arearents-surge-back-up-again-when-will-it-end/ [https://perma.cc/SS3V-XG2U].
44. CITY OF SEATTLE, HOUSING SEATTLE: A ROADMAP TO AN AFFORDABLE AND
LIVABLE CITY 2 (2015) [hereinafter CITY OF SEATTLE, HOUSING SEATTLE],
https://murray.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/HALA_ActionPlan_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BV5-CXN9].
45. CITY OF PHILA, FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 32, at 8.
46. See CITY OF SEATTLE, HOUSING SEATTLE, supra note 44.
47. Reina, supra note 33, at 4.
AND
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process or in the course of operating the property — become
permanently affordable.
III. DEFINING PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY
Before exploring the concept of permanent affordability, it is
important to establish the nature of affordability restrictions on
housing developments. The federal government rolled out a series of
programs that provided subsidies to private owners, in exchange for
owners keeping a certain share of units in the development affordable
for a fixed period after the creation of HUD in 1965.48 The number
of units required to be affordable, the level of affordability, and the
length of the affordability restrictions vary by program.49 This model
— the disposition of public subsidies to private owners, conditioned
on the development and management of subsidized affordable
housing for a fixed period — has become the primary model
employed by federal, state, and local subsidized housing programs.50
Municipalities increasingly view this as a model for developing new
loan and grant programs in their attempt to incentivize owners of
existing private market affordable housing to preserve the stock of
privately-owned affordable housing.51
When most federal subsidized housing programs were created
during the 1960s through the 1980s, U.S. cities were suffering from
decline or disinvestment.52 As a result, the structure of these

48. See BEGLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 9, 20; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at
203–23.
49. See supra note 48.
50. For example, the federally funded and state administered Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) is the “single largest subsidy for the
production of low-income rental housing.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 135. Under
the program, state agencies award tax credits to investors for low-income rental
developments. Id. At the local level, increasingly popular inclusionary zoning
programs reward developers for producing affordable units with height, density, or
other bonuses. See Jenny Schuetz et al., Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse? The Effects of
Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets in the United States, 48 URB. STUD.
297, 298 (2011), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098009360683
[https://perma.cc/9W55-EBP9].
51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ginsburg, Enterprise and HPD Launch Landlord

Ambassadors Program to Preserve Affordable Housing Through Community
Engagement,
ENTERPRISE
(May
10,
2017),

https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/new-york-landlord-ambassadors-program
[https://perma.cc/2Z2S-PCVL].
52. See George Sternlieb & James Hughes, The Uncertain Future of the Central
City, 18 URB. AFF. Q. 455, 458 (1983); see also Edward Glaeser & Jesse Shapiro, Is
There a New Urbanism? The Growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s 2 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8357, 2001) (finding that, with the exceptions of
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programs reflected the government’s desire to maximize the number
of affordable units developed, the length of affordability of the units,
and the number of developers engaged in the production of such
units.
The Mitchell-Lama program, a middle-income housing
program in New York City, best exemplifies this desire.53 The
Mitchell-Lama program required a 35-year affordability restriction
when it was created in 1955 by the State of New York. The length of
this affordability requirement resulted in low participation rates.54
The 35-year affordability restriction was subsequently reduced to 15
years in 1959, and then increased to 20 years in 1960.55 The reduction
in the affordability term subsequently increased participation in the
program.56 The federal LIHTC program57 is another federal subsidy
program that subsidizes developers to provide affordable housing.58
Created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC program
initially only required a 15-year affordability commitment.59 Three
years later, in 1989, the restriction period was increased to 30 years.60
In many states where the allocation of these credits is highly
competitive, the affordability restriction period can be as long as 60
years.61
An important feature of the affordability restrictions in every
subsidized housing program, except for public housing, is the
expiration of the affordability period. In some cases, the affordability
restriction period is coterminous with the subsidy period, and the

Milwaukee in the 1950s and Columbus in the 1970s, “in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s,
almost every Northeastern or Midwestern city with more than 500,000 people shrank
in every decade”).
53. Mitchell-Lama,
NYC
HOUSING
PRESERVATION
&
DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/mitchell-lama.page
[https://perma.cc/EY8VTHUR] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
54. History, MITCHELL-LAMA RESIDENTS COALITION, http://www.mitchelllama.org/history.html [https://perma.cc/7PBY-CJAU] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax
TAX
POL’Y
CTR.,
URB.
INST.
&
BROOKINGS
INST.,
System,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-creditand-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/K8D8-XHPS] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
58. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 135–59.
59. Id. at 135, 150.
60. Id. at 151.
61. See JEREMY GUSTAFSON & J. CHRISTOPHER WALKER, URB. INST., ANALYSIS
OF STATE QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLANS FOR THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT PROGRAM 18–19 (2002). By 2001, 41 states either required or favored
projects with affordability periods of 40 to 60 years, and some have incentivized
perpetual affordability, as in the case of Massachusetts, Michigan, and Vermont. Id.
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owner has the option to renew their subsidy and affordability
commitment at the same time.62 When a contract expires, an owner
can re-commit to a new, limited period contract, during which they
continue to receive their subsidy.63 Thus, the owner continues to
receive the financial benefit of the subsidy in exchange for prolonged
affordability. However, in other programs, such as the LIHTC
program, there is no ability to renew the subsidy without reapplying
for it directly.64
Not all owners who reach the end of their affordability restriction
period exit the subsidy programs.65 However, the expiration of a
development’s affordability requirements is a distinct point at which
some owners opt to leave subsidy programs.66 Property owners in
areas where the local housing values are appreciating are more likely
to exit subsidy programs.67 Furthermore, owners are more likely to
exit subsidy programs where properties are located in areas where
residential economic opportunities are increasing, housing
affordability is declining, and the ability to profitably develop new
affordable units is diminishing.68 But, evidence shows that the
development of subsidized housing increases property values in

62. This is true in the project-based Section 8 program. See Section 8 Program
Information,
U.S.
DEP’T
HOUSING
&
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/mfh/rfp/s8bkinfo
[https://perma.cc/4BDB-PKXU] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
63. See id.
64. See JILL KHADDURI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT
HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND
BEYOND?
v–vi
(2012),
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/what_happens_lihtc_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9JT-QVYS].
65. The decision to opt in or out is associated with property characteristics such as
location, property type, size, and age, and the type and level of assistance. See
MERYL FINKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., MULTIFAMILY
PROPERTIES: OPTING IN, OPTING OUT, AND REMAINING AFFORDABLE 67–69 (2006),
https://www.huduser.gov/Publications/pdf/opting_in.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4SZ6VMH].
66. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at xii–xvii, 61–71.
67. See Vincent Reina & Jaclene Begley, Will They Stay or Will They Go:
Predicting Subsidized Housing Opt-Outs, 23 J. HOUSING ECON. 1, 11 (2014). “[A] one
unit . . . increase in the percent change in neighborhood property appreciation over
the past five years increases the hazard rate of opt out by 242%.” Id. at 9.
68. See Michael C. Lens & Vincent Reina, Preserving Neighborhood
Opportunity: Where Federal Housing Subsidies Expire, 26 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
714, 727 (2016). Housing projects subsidized through HUD’s project-based Section 8
program and due to expire between 2011 and 2020 are located in higher-opportunity
neighborhoods than the average unit leased with a housing voucher. Id. at 728.
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distressed neighborhoods.69 This means that in many cases, public
investments in subsidized affordable housing help revitalize
neighborhoods, but these units are often converted to market rate
once these areas become opportunity neighborhoods.70 As a result,
housing advocates push for permanent affordability mandates on all
properties receiving a public subsidy.71
There is no set definition for what constitutes permanent
affordability. The general premise of permanent affordability is that
a public entity, not a private owner, decides when the affordability
restrictions on a property expire.72 Thus, if a public entity decides a
development cannot terminate its affordability requirements, then it
is effectively affordable in perpetuity. Emily Thaden captures the
concept well:
Permanently Affordable Housing . . . refers to all types of housing
with lasting affordability . . . . [d]iffering from the shorter
affordability periods required by federal programs to support the
production of affordable housing, these maintain the affordability of
housing over the long-term in order to preserve the affordable
housing stock and the public’s investment in affordable housing
production.73

This definition suggests a system that could be similar to rent
control, but also quite different, depending on interpretation. Similar

69. Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing Depress
Neighborhood Property Values?, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 257, 257 (2007).
70. The concept of “neighborhood opportunity” is based on the idea that
neighborhood characteristics play a significant role in the life outcomes of the people
who live in them. See Ingrid Gould Ellen & Margery Turner, Does Neighborhood
Matter? Assessing Recent Evidence, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 833, 833 (1997).
“Opportunity neighborhoods” are therefore neighborhoods in which the social and
economic environment favors positive life outcomes such as educational attainment,
employment, and income mobility. See Lens & Reina, supra note 68, at 716–18.
71. See Dulchin, supra note 5, at 1. Note that the Association for Neighborhood
and Housing Development (ANHD) has been campaigning for permanent
affordability for at least a decade. See generally KELLY ANNE JOHNSTONE, ASS’N FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY: A NATIONAL
CONVERSATION (2009), https://anhd.org/report/permanent-affordability-nationalconversation-0 [https://perma.cc/6ML7-D4CH].
72. See CHERYL CORT, COAL. FOR SMARTER GROWTH, LONG-TERM HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY
FOR
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
17
(2017),
https://www.smartergrowth.net/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/LongTermAffordability_FINAL_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FBG8-MZ3L].
73. Emily Thaden, Permanently Affordable Housing: Sector Chart & Glossary of
Terms, NAT’L COMMUNITY LAND TR. NETWORK (2015), http://cltnetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Permanently-Affordable-Housing-Sector-Chart-Glossary11-2014-design-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7TS-5NGF].
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to rent control, a permanent affordability mandate could mean that
rents must not increase by more than a certain share in any given
year.74 Alternatively, it could mean that rent levels must remain
lower than the median or mean rent for an area. The third option —
and most common interpretation75 — is that permanent affordability
requires rent to be set at a level which is affordable for households
earning a predetermined share of the area median income.76 Under
this third scenario, permanent affordability is a concept distinct from
rent control because it is a requirement to rent units to low-income
households, ensuring they spend no more than 30% of their income
on rent. A clear theme across all of these definitions of permanent
affordability is that rents are restricted in perpetuity, and any
determination beyond that will likely reflect the local affordability
problem. The resources and political will to address this problem will
occur through such mandates.
IV. POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF PERMANENT
AFFORDABILITY
There are potential opportunities and challenges of permanent
affordability mandates, and these tradeoffs vary across time and
markets.77 There are several main arguments in favor of permanent
affordability mandates. First, preservation of affordable housing
costs less than the construction of new housing, and therefore should
be prioritized.78 Next, permanent affordability mandates reduce the

74. See, e.g., TIMOTHY COLLINS, NYC RENT GUIDELINES BD., AN INTRODUCTION
NYC RENT GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM 89
(2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/history/intro.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZYV-7EPB].
75. See, e.g., Nico Calvita & Kenneth Grimes, Inclusionary Housing in California:
The Experience of Two Decades, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 150, 151 (1998); Robert
Hickey et al., Achieving Lasting Affordability through Inclusionary Housing 7–9
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. 14RH1, 2014); CORT, supra note 72,
at 7.
76. For example, households in project-based Section 8 developments must have
incomes below 80% of area median income. See Policy Basics: Section 8 ProjectBased Rental Assistance, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-section-8-project-based-rentalassistance [https://perma.cc/HJY8-52PU]. While 80% of area median income is the
maximum allowed income for residents of Section 8 project-based rentals, the
program further requires that at least 40% of units are available to those households
making below 30% of area median income. Id.
77. This is a difficulty inherent in developing any universal policy.
78. See Charles Wilkins et al., Comparing the Life-Cycle Costs of New
Construction and Acquisition-Rehab of Affordable Multifamily Rental Housing, 25
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 684, 708 (2015).
TO THE
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gaming of subsidy systems and the administrative costs associated
with the existing preservation process.79 In addition, these mandates
increase household stability and protect, or potentially increase,
access to opportunity neighborhoods.80 Lastly, they shield existing
subsidized affordable housing from the federal government’s shifting
political priorities.81
Conversely, such mandates could result in several negative
outcomes, including: increasing initial development costs and
reducing the number of units being produced; decreasing
participation in existing subsidized housing programs; negatively
affecting where new subsidized housing units are created; creating
future obligations that exacerbate the tradeoffs between allocating
funds to preservation versus new construction; and increasing
monitoring costs.82 Ultimately, while permanent affordability can
preserve the affordability of a unit, it does not guarantee the
households in those units will not be rent burdened.83
The list of opportunities and challenges discussed in this section
highlight the complexity of permanent affordability mandates.
However, these potential adverse outcomes do not negate the value
of permanent affordability as a policy that municipalities should
consider and possibly pursue.
A. The Potential of Permanent Affordability Mandates
One of the primary cases made in support of permanent
affordability is the reduced cost associated with maintaining the
affordability of existing housing units84 — namely, that the per-unit
cost of preserving an existing property as affordable is often less than
the cost of developing a new affordable unit. 85 In the short term, the

79. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at 6.
80. See infra notes 97–104.
81. See infra notes 105–07.
82. See infra notes 108–24.
83. See infra notes 125–128.
84. For example, HUD argues that “preserving existing affordable rental housing
offers many advantages,” and cites as first among these that “the nation’s stock of
government-subsidized affordable rentals represents a taxpayer-funded investment
worth billions of dollars” that would cost much less to preserve than rebuild.

Preserving Affordable Rental Housing: A Snapshot of Growing Need, Current
Threats, and Innovative Solutions, OFF. POL’Y DEV. & RES. (2013),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer13/highlight1.html#title
[https://perma.cc/8HFP-MJD9].
85. One study finds that the life-cycle cost of producing new multifamily housing
is 25–45% higher than the cost of acquiring and rehabilitating (i.e., preserving) an
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preservation of existing affordable housing does not reduce existing
rent burden levels but does help ensure that housing affordability
problems do not worsen.86 In the long term, the preservation of
existing affordable housing could potentially increase the number of
affordable units because it reduces the number of units exiting the
housing stock due to poor physical condition.
Introducing a permanent affordability mandate makes it easier to
preserve the affordability of an existing subsidized affordable
property. Currently, when affordability restrictions expire, owners of
subsidized units can use their actual or potential market return to
extract additional resources from public entities hoping to preserve
the affordability of those units.87 This is true for owners of existing
unsubsidized units with rents below the median for a particular
market.88 Specifically, an owner of an existing subsidized affordable
housing development has two options: (1) maintain his or her
property as affordable housing with or without a subsidy or (2) have
rents follow market demand.89 Thus, the owner is always deciding
between affordability and the market.90 It is not only current market

affordable multifamily property. See Reina, supra note 33, at 27; Wilkins et al., supra
note 78, at 704–05.
86. Even residents LIHTC properties are frequently rent burdened. Preserving
these properties does not reduce or eliminate these burdens; it merely maintains the
existing level of affordability. See Anne Williamson, Can They Afford the Rent?
Resident Cost Burden in Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments, 47 URB.
AFF. REV. 755, 791 (2011).
87. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at 48. The owners of LIHTC properties
may seek additional tax credit allocations at the end of their contracts because it is
profitable. Indeed, “a number of development firms have embraced resyndication
and rehabilitation of older affordable properties as a business model.” Id. at 55.
88. Atticus Jaramillo, NOAH: Everything You Need to Know, CAROLINA PLAN.
J. (April 7, 2017), https://carolinaangles.com/2017/04/07/noah-everything-you-needto-know/ [https://perma.cc/EE5V-ZZNJ]. For example, an affordably priced 698-unit
apartment complex in Richfield, Minnesota was sold in 2015, and the new owner
raised rents and instituted new lease-up requirements, resulting in the displacement
of about 80% of the residents. Id. This event, on its own, offset nearly all the
production of new affordable housing in the Twin Cities metro area that had
occurred the preceding year. Id. The risk of losing so-called “naturally occurring
affordable housing,” or NOAH, has motivated government and nonprofit entities to
create preservation strategies specifically for unsubsidized properties. Id.
89. For existing subsidized housing units this happens at the point where all
affordability restrictions on the property expire, whereas for unsubsidized property
this can happen at the end of a lease in the case of increasing rent or at any point in
the case of a property sale. See Reina & Begley, supra note 67, at 2.
90. In the case of existing subsidized housing, the Association of Neighborhood
and Housing Development describes this choice as being between “the value of
cashing out and going to market, versus the value the government will provide him or
her to keep the property affordable.” See DULCHIN, supra note 5, at 8. Evidence
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values that affect an owner’s decision to exit a subsidy program, but
also the anticipated growth in values.91 Public officials must either
negotiate with owners seeking to exit an affordability program or risk
losing subsidized affordable units. Indeed, there is an economic
incentive for owners who are interested in maintaining the
affordability of their properties to pretend otherwise in order to
extract resources from a public entity. A permanent affordability
restriction limits an owner’s negotiating power. If a property has a
permanent affordability restriction, then its owner must keep the unit
affordable, and thus has less leverage when negotiating with a public
entity for resources. Under the permanent affordability scenario, the
owner is only able to negotiate subsidies based on the rehabilitation
costs needed to maintain the property, as opposed to potential sales
prices or rent potential. As a result, the public cost of preserving
affordability falls.
Permanent affordability mandates also reduce the administrative
costs of preserving affordable and subsidized housing. Research on
preserving affordable housing highlights the need for coalitions of
advocates, developers, residents, and government officials to work
together and use data to proactively determine where rents are likely
to increase, or subsidies will expire.92 Further, current research also
emphasizes that these partnerships between stakeholders, advocates,
tenants, and the government take time to develop and require
considerable resources to be sustained.93 Ultimately, a permanent
affordability restriction reduces some of this complexity surrounding
the preservation of low-cost housing. First, less advocacy and
organizing is needed to pressure owners to keep properties affordable
if they are required to do so.94 Further, much of the cost of litigating
preservation will be eliminated if there is a clear mandate tied to
affordability.95 While there will still be litigation from owners looking
shows that this calculation is likely different for nonprofit owners because of their
social mission, but for all other owners that is not the case. See Reina & Begley,
supra note 67, at 7.
91. See Reina & Begley, supra note 67, at 7. Properties located in neighborhoods
with high property value growth and for-profit owners are more likely to opt out of
the Mitchell-Lama program. Id.
92. Kathryn Howell et al., One Size Fits None: Local Context and Planning for
the Preservation of Affordable Housing, 29 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 148, 162 (2019).
93. Kathryn Howell, Neighborhoods, Local Networks and the Non-Linear Path of
the Expiration and Preservation of Federal Rental Subsidies, 55 URB. STUD. 3092,
3107 (2018).
94. See DULCHIN, supra note 5, at 8.
95. Currently, organizers and residents litigate to preserve affordable housing
from owner opt-outs by intervening in federal foreclosure proceedings to promote
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to exit affordability restrictions, a permanent affordability mandate
reduces these instances and consequently reduces the current cost to
the public of preservation.96
A permanent affordability mandate could also increase housing
stability and neighborhood access.97 While it remains unclear
whether neighborhood improvement leads to direct displacement,
even households not displaced from an appreciating neighborhood
can be forced into a sub-optimal living situation in order to maintain
access to that neighborhood.98 Preservation can be a bulwark against
potential displacement. In addition, many existing affordable units,
and particularly older subsidized housing units, are currently located
in higher-opportunity neighborhoods.99 These older subsidized
housing units are more likely to have reached, or be on the verge of
approaching, the end of their affordability restriction period.100
Finally, households living in properties where a subsidy has expired
have a higher propensity to move due to said subsidy expiration.101 In

preservation sales; enforcing the prepayment restrictions in federal mortgages;
participating in bankruptcy proceedings to preserve project subsidies; using state law
to preserve state-subsidized projects; and enforcing the city’s right-to-purchase
legislation. See Ellen Davidson & Ed Josephson, Preserving New York’s Subsidized
Housing Through Litigation, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 437, 438 (2009).
96. Developers have challenged inclusionary housing mandates on the basis that
they violate the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and could mount
similar challenges against permanent affordability restrictions. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates, in EVIDENCE
& INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAND AND POLICY 64, 66 (Lee Anne Fennell &
Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017).
97. There is a large body of literature addressing neighborhood change and its
relationship with displacement. For a thorough review of this literature, see Ingrid
Gould Ellen & Katherine M. O’Regan, How Low-Income Neighborhoods Change:
Entry, Exit, and Enhancement, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 89, 90 (2011).
98. Kathe Newman and Elvin Wyly found that households in gentrifying
neighborhoods who remained in that neighborhood were more likely to double up,
pay a higher share of their income in rent, or live in sub-optimal housing. See Kathe
Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and
Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23, 48–49 (2006).
99. Lens & Reina, supra note 68, at 727.
100. LIHTC properties completed before 1989 were subject to a 15-year
affordability restriction, while later-year buildings must maintain their affordability
for 30 years. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 151. HUD-subsidized properties have
varying affordability periods, typically 20 to 40 years. See id. at 203–11. Since many
subsidy programs for privately-owned rental housing were created in the 1960s and
1970s, some older properties have already reached the ends of these periods. Id.
101. See Vincent Reina, The Impact of Mobility and Government Rental Subsidies
on the Welfare of Households and Affordability of Markets 41–64 (Aug. 9, 2016)
(Ph.D.
dissertation,
Univ.
of
S.
Cal.),
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll40/id/281192
[https://perma.cc/9JXB-4CZJ].
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some circumstances where an existing place-based subsidy expires,
households are eligible for a voucher as a form of safety net to
prevent a household from displacement.102 Those who can use the
voucher tend to move to slightly lower-poverty neighborhoods.103
However, less than 50% of those households eligible for the voucher
succeed in using it, despite the high level of demand.104 An
affordability mandate on a property would likely reduce the odds of
displacement from a housing unit. Such a mandate may also allow a
household to remain in neighborhoods that have improved or are
improving because it shields that household from rent increases (and
the threat thereof). As a result, mandating permanent affordability
could ensure low-income households are not displaced, regardless of
whether the housing is subsidized, and ensure households can remain
in a neighborhood as it improves.
Finally, an essential feature of a permanent affordability mandate
is its ability to protect existing affordable housing from national
policy shifts which reduce support for affordable housing. In 2018,
the federal government suspended most of its operations due to an
impasse on the federal debt limit extension, which affected the federal
government’s ability to honor some of its subsidy payments.105 This
occurred amid budget proposals that would reduce or eliminate
funding for many subsidized housing programs.106 Such events serve
to reduce confidence in the government’s commitment to providing
housing subsidies, and could negatively affect an owner’s desire to
remain in a subsidized housing program.107 As a result, it is likely that
when allowed to opt out, a distrustful owner would rationally do so.

102. Vincent Reina & Ben Winter, Safety Net? The Use of Vouchers When a
Place-Based Rental Subsidy Ends, 56 URB. STUD. 2092, 2093 (2019).
103. Id. at 2103.
104. Id. at 2094.
105. Suzy Khimm & Laura Strickler, Because of the Shutdown, More Than 1,000
Affordable Housing Contracts Have Expired, NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/because-shutdown-more-1-000affordable-housing-contracts-have-expired-n955971 [https://perma.cc/F6X7-AQGF].
106. President Trump Proposes Drastic Cuts to Affordable Housing Programs,
LOW
INCOME
HOUSING
COALITION
(Mar.
11,
2019),
NAT’L
https://nlihc.org/resource/president-trump-proposes-drastic-cuts-affordable-housingprograms [https://perma.cc/M4EY-RMXZ]. President Trump’s proposed budget
would have eliminated or greatly reduced funding to programs such as the Housing
Trust Fund, the HOME Investment Partnership program, and public housing capital
repair. Id.
107. See Amanda Abrams, The Government Shutdown Put Thousands at Risk for
Eviction: Officials Worried About Loss of Trust, YES! MAG. (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/trust-in-hud-public-housing-at-stake-overlooming-government-shutdown-20190212 [https://perma.cc/5CWW-37DN].
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A permanent affordability restriction would limit an owner’s ability to
make this choice, preserving the unit’s affordability amid such shifts
in federal affordable housing subsidies.
B. Challenges and Unintended Consequences of Mandating
Permanent Affordability
While many of these features of affordability mandates seem
desirable, they do not come without costs. One main argument made
against a permanent affordability mandate is that it could decrease
the number of affordable housing units being developed, as well as
the pool of owners willing to enter affordability agreements.108 There
is a constant tension between the desire to promote housing
affordability with incentives and mandates, and ensuring that those
incentives and mandates do not affect developers’ and owners’
willingness to engage in programs. This debate is reflected in the
creation of inclusionary zoning policies. Inclusionary zoning uses a
mixture of incentives and mandates to leverage existing market-rate
development to increase the supply, and diversify the location, of
affordable housing.109 There are a myriad of inclusionary housing
programs, and ultimately much uncertainty about the net impact of
these policies on housing production and affordability.110
Like inclusionary zoning, a permanent affordability restriction
could have two effects on an owner’s decision-making. First, this
restriction could reduce the likelihood of an owner engaging in an
affordable housing program at all because it reduces an owner’s longterm return on their investment.111 A permanent mandate restricts
108. For arguments against perpetual affordability restrictions in inclusionary
zoning programs, see generally NAT’L ASS’N HOME BUILDERS, INCLUSIONARY
ZONING
PRIMER
(2015),
https://www.nahb.org/~/media/Sites/NAHB/Research/Priorities/September-2015Updated-NAHB-Inclusionary-Zoning-Primer.ashx? [https://perma.cc/3857-CF7X].
109. See generally Jenny Schuetz et al., 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning:
Comparing Policies from San Francisco, Washington, DC, and Suburban Boston, 75
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 441 (2009) (providing an overview of the variation in types of
inclusionary zoning programs).
110. See Emily Thaden & Ruoniu Wang, Inclusionary Housing in the United
States: Prevalence, Impact, and Practices 14–31 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working
Paper No. WP17ET1, Sept. 2017). Thaden and Wang also review a broad set of
inclusionary zoning programs. Id. While they point to the number of units developed,
this estimate does not subtract the counterfactual, that is, the number of units that
would have been developed had these programs not existed. Id. at 31. As a result, the
large number of units developed are a sign of success, but it is not clear that a lower
number of units would have been developed absent the policy. Id. at 58.
111. For a description of the financial considerations facing developers subject to
affordable housing restrictions, see Rachel Bratt, Affordable Rental Housing
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rents for a more extended period of time and raises the risk
associated with the future sale of the property.112 A future purchaser
would be required to maintain the affordability of the property.113
Moreover, in some instances, a purchaser may even need to be
approved by a public entity, thus reducing the sales price and
potential pool of purchasers.114 In addition, an owner who knows
they need to keep their property below market rate will likely face
higher upfront capital costs in order to establish the reserves required
to maintain the property over time.115 This capital requirement
increases the initial development or preservation cost of a property
with a permanent affordability mandate.116 Together, these two
factors reduce the return on developing or preserving affordable
housing, absent a subsidy accounting for that difference. The lower
return could then reduce the number of actors engaging in affordable
housing development and preservation, thus negatively impacting the
actual number of units developed and preserved overall.
A second potential consequence of permanent affordability
mandates is the potential effect on the location of affordable housing.
Owners in high appreciation areas are less likely to commit to
restricting rent levels absent a subsidy that matches or exceeds the

Development in the U.S. For-Profit Sector: Implications of a Case Study of
McCormack Baron Salazar, 28 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489 (2018).
112. See id. at 496–97. The developer in the case study sold 19% of its subsidized

properties at year 15, sometimes because the combination of restricted rents and the
lack of additional public resources made it impossible to reposition the assets for
another 15 years such that they would remain financially viable. Id.
113. Affordability restrictions, until they expire, are passed onto subsequent
purchasers. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 64, at 51–52.
114. The existing pool of affordable housing developers is already limited by rising
development costs, limited returns, and cuts to government subsidy programs. See
Gabriella Chiarenza, Challenges for Affordable Housing in a New Era of Scarcity, 25
COMMUNITY INV. 2, 3 (2013).
115. See CORP. FOR SUPPORTIVE HOUS., CAPITALIZED RENTAL SUBSIDY
RESERVES:
CONCEPT
SUMMARY
1
(2006),
https://www.csh.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/CapitalizedReservepdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/43MV-XER2].
Affordable housing developers create reserve funds to insure against unforeseen
costs and to protect the project’s long-term viability. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, A
GUIDE
TO
AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
FUNDING
SOURCES
11
(2008),
https://www.nj.gov/dca/affiliates/coah/resources/planresources/fundguide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2BP-ZRXW]. Such funds must be greater if the project operates
at reduced rents for an extended period of time. Id. These funds are often capitalized
into the project’s development budget, thus raising the initial cost of development. Id.
116. Id.
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expected return on the market.117 Consequently, a permanent
affordability mandate could reduce the development and preservation
of existing affordable and/or subsidized units in high-cost or highappreciation markets. However, owners may be willing to accept a
subsidy in exchange for a commitment to permanent affordability if
their properties are located in areas where there is greater uncertainty
about future appreciation. A permanent affordability mandate could
push development and preservation away from higher-opportunity
areas, or areas that are improving, to exclusively declining, stagnant,
or uncertain markets.
A primary concern with a permanent affordability mandate is the
likelihood that impacted properties will need subsidies at a later point
in order to meet that mandate, thus creating an ongoing pipeline of
properties needing public subsidies. Every property, even those
capitalized with significant reserves during its initial financing, will
eventually need to be rehabilitated, and the cost of those future
repairs are difficult to predict. The reduced rent levels mandated by
an affordability restriction reduce the amount of debt a property can
carry. This reduction in debt effectively limits the amount of capital
that can be used to rehabilitate a property.118 Consequently, this
would mean that properties subject to a permanent affordability
mandate will likely need additional financing in the future to maintain
the quality of units and meet this mandate. This quandary creates a
set pool of properties that will need reoccuring subsidies over time.
Furthermore, some properties will need additional public resources to
remain viable subsidized affordable housing options and will be
competing for the same resources being used to develop new units.119

117. Mitchell-Lama property owners, for example, were much less likely to
recommit to affordability restrictions in areas experiencing above-average property
value appreciation. See Reina & Begley, supra note 67, at 6–7, 10.
118. Some developers use additional federal rental subsidy programs, such as
Section 8 rental assistance, to ensure they can both meet their affordability goals and
maintain higher rent levels to attract the capital required to maintain their property.
Section 8 rental assistance, either through the project-based Section 8 or the voucher
program, is a subsidy that covers the gap between the HUD approved rent for a unit
and the tenant rent payment. The tenant rent payment is set at 30% of household
income. As a result, the subsidy allows an owner to attract capital based on market
rents, but ensures tenants are not rent burdened. The demand for Section 8 subsidies
exceeds the supply, which means not all properties can benefit from this resource.
For more details on the programs and subsidy layering, see Vincent Reina & Michael
Williams, The Importance of Using Layered Data to Analyze Housing: The Case of
the Subsidized Housing Information Project, 14 CITYSCAPE 215 (2012). For more
details on the high demand for Section 8 subsidies, see Landis & Reina, supra note
12, at 12, 15–16.
119. Reina, supra note 33, at 4.
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Ultimately, in many years going forward there will be more
subsidized housing units in need of preservation than the annual
average number of units developed through the LIHTC.120 In New
York City, for example, nearly 60% of the existing LIHTC units that
needed reposition between 2008 and 2015 required additional forms
of public investment.121 While the cost per unit was well below that of
new construction, this still reflects an increasing commitment of
public resources to the preservation of existing affordable housing,
which could come at the cost of subsidizing new developments.122
A final challenge with a permanent affordability mandate is the
required additional monitoring of units. The monitoring of units
comes in two primary forms: ensuring low-income households are
renting them and ensuring housing quality standards are met.123
Adequate monitoring is essential to the success of long-term
affordability mandates, and necessitates a public investment in the
capacity of public agencies to monitor the affordability of these
properties.124
Finally, one item that is both an opportunity and a challenge of
permanent affordability is the mandated level of affordability. It is
expensive to develop affordable housing for the lowest income
households.125 Accordingly, even some of the units developed

120. Id. at Figure 1 at 4.
121. DULCHIN, supra note 5, at 9.
122. The cost of preserving affordable units is well below that of constructing new
ones. See Wilkins et al., supra note 78, at 707–08. But the costs of preservation can
still be so high as to impede new construction. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 211.
For example, the cost of renewing Section 8 contracts, even when renewed for very
short periods, “escalated nearly to the point of absorbing HUD’s entire budget” in
the 2000s. Id.
123. See, for example, the Washington D.C. Department of Housing and
Community Development’s project monitoring functions. Department of Housing
and Community Development, DC.GOV, https://dhcd.dc.gov/service/projectmonitoring [https://perma.cc/EW6J-WAQS] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). The
department conducts two primary types of oversight of projects developed through
federal and local subsidy programs: quality assurance and compliance monitoring. Id.
124. Alex Schwartz & Edwin Melendez, After Year 15: Challenges to the
Preservation of Housing Financed with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, 9
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 261, 262, 289 (2008). “[Many states] have yet to devise
systems to monitor long-term compliance with [affordability] requirements or
sanctions in the event of violation.” Id. at 262.
125. See ANDREW JAKABOVICS ET AL., URB. LAND INST., BENDING THE COST
CURVE: SOLUTIONS TO EXPAND THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE RENTALS 8–9 (2014).
Housing development costs are driven by “site constraints, design elements, local
land use and zoning restrictions, building codes, [and] delays in the development
process.” Id. at 8. In the case of deeply affordable housing, costs are increased by
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through the LIHTC program, the primary tool for developing new
subsidized affordable housing units, are often only affordable at 50%
or 60% of area median income.126 As a result, many households
earning less than that amount live in a subsidized unit but are still rent
burdened.127 On the other hand, because of HUD’s ongoing rental
support, households in project-based Section 8 developments are
guaranteed that their rent will not exceed 30% of their income.128 In
both cases, a permanent affordability restriction would ensure the
preservation of an affordable unit, but only in one of the cases would
it ensure that households are not rent burdened.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Ten years ago, nearly every economist argued that rent control was
an inefficient policy because it reduced the supply of housing.129
However, given today’s affordability challenges, at least one wellregarded economist has argued that every tool needs to be on the
table, and policies like rent control may be important for increasing
the stock of affordable housing in some settings and for certain
periods of time.130 Like rent control, permanent affordability
deserves reconsideration. For instance, when the Mitchell-Lama
program was created, mandating longer affordability commitment
periods was challenging.131 Today, however, developers are actively
competing for subsidies with affordability restriction periods —

subsidy program regulations and by the services and amenities necessary to improve
the lives of very low-income households. Id. at 18–20.
126. The Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy found that of 12,228
LIHTC developments in 16 states, 21% of tenants had incomes at or above 50% of
area median income. NYU FURMAN CTR. & MOELIS INST., WHAT CAN WE LEARN
ABOUT THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM BY LOOKING AT
TENANTS?
3–4
(2012),
https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/LIHTC_Final_Policy_Brief_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3W9-7R64].
127. Anne R. Williamson, Can They Afford the Rent? Resident Cost Burden in
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments, 47 URB. AFF. REV. 775, 791 (2011).
128. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 207, 222.
129. See generally Blair Jenkins, Rent Control: Do Economists Agree?, 6 ECON. J.
WATCH 73 (2009). For a review of rent control literature, see LISA STURTEVANT,
NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL RES. FOUND., THE IMPACTS OF RENT
CONTROL:
A
RESEARCH
REVIEW
AND
SYNTHESIS
10–12
(2018),
https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-reviewfinal2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QNM-L98M].
130. See Gary Painter, No, Rent Control Doesn’t Always Reduce the Supply of
Housing, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oepainter-rent-control-economist-20181031-story.html [https://perma.cc/VZ48-QTDT].
131. See MITCHELL-LAMA RESIDENTS COALITION, supra note 54.
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sometimes more than 60 years.132 While 60 years is not perpetuity, a
60-year long restriction period may pose the same negative
development incentives of a permanent affordability mandate. So,
how can one determine when the clear long-term benefits of a
permanent affordability mandate outweigh the potential challenges?
One solution is that municipalities can estimate the option value
associated with a permanent affordability mandate. Essentially, how
much is a government willing to pay now to preserve the affordability
of a unit in the future? Or, how much is the government willing to
pay in order to maintain the option to decide the best use of the land
that the property is developed on, which could or could not be deemd
to be for affordable housing? This payment can come in different
forms. First, it can be a direct public subsidy which increases the rate
of return, or one which increases the security of the return, for
developers who agree to such a restriction. For example, the
permanent affordability mandate might be accompanied by a subsidy
which allows for a higher initial developer fee that is extracted at the
time of financing, or it could subsidize deeper reserves to ensure the
long-term viability of property, offering a moderate return.133
Municipalities should acknowledge that zoning variances, tax
abatements and land given to developers for free or at below market
prices, are also significant subsidies. They should also acknowledge
that when we consider these forms of public supports as “subsidies,”
the public actually subsidizes a larger share of housing development
than just those units with federal rental subsidies. Further, in
instances where a city gives a developer land — land that will not be
returned to the city — the future value of the land should be
considered when evaluating the appropriateness of long-term
affordability mandates.
A future value calculation of a permanent affordability mandate
could also vary based on where units are being developed. For

132. For instance, New York City’s 9% LIHTC deals come with an affordability
restriction of 60 years, yet it remains highly competitive. Press Release, N.Y.C.
Housing Preservation & Dev., HPD Announces the Award of $18.1 Million in Tax
Credits to Create Nearly 1,000 Affordable Homes Across the Five Boroughs (Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/about/press-releases/2018/12/hpdannounces-the-award-of-tax-credits.page [https://perma.cc/9LSV-GY2Z].
133. “Moderate” meaning something along the lines of the return on a bond. Longterm government bonds have returned an average of 5.7% per year since 1926,
compared with 10.1% per year for stocks. VISTA CAPITAL PARTNERS, THE OPTIMAL
PORTFOLIO (2015), https://vistacp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-OptimalPortfolio1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UZQ-GKX3].
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example, a municipality may see a higher value associated with the
option of preserving future affordability in a neighborhood showing
early signs of price appreciation because the chances of preserving or
developing affordable housing on land in those areas my be less
financially feasible in the future, as opposed to one that is still
declining. As a result, the municipality may be willing to offer a
subsidy in exchange for a permanent affordability restriction in the
former case, and offer a proportionately lower subsidy in exchange
for a restriction in the latter case.
Alternatively, a municipality could elect not to provide any subsidy
to incentivize owners to commit to permanent affordability, taking on
the risk of fewer units being developed but that those developed are
permanently affordable. In essence, municipalities may decide that
future affordability expirations could offset current development
levels, and that fewer units initially produced with longer restrictions
will result in a larger supply of affordable housing in the long term.
Regardless of the scenario, municipalities should consider the value
of the future option of preservation and use that to guide their
decisions around a permanent affordability mandate. A universal
program requiring properties to receive any subsidy to be
permanently affordable may not be as efficient as one that varies
based on current, and perceived future, market dynamics.
CONCLUSION
Ensuring there is an adequate supply of affordable housing in good
condition for the lowest-income households is an important housing
policy goal. The need for such housing has become all the more
important because most low-income households across the country
face crippling housing cost burdens. Even if there was a large-scale
supply response to current demand for housing, significant subsidies
would still be needed to alleviate the severe rent burdens that the
lowest-income households face. This lack of affordable housing
places increased pressure on the limited resources the government
has to supply affordable rental units. As a result, advocates have
called for more aggressive affordability requirements to accompany
public subsidies for housing, with some suggesting permanent
affordability mandates. Permanent affordability mandates can be an
important tool to ensure an adequate supply of affordable and
suitable housing options, but this approach does not come without
drawbacks.
This Article highlights the complexity of mandating permanent
affordability.
There are many potential benefits of placing

1294

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

affordability restrictions on properties that are in perpetuity. A
primary reason for permanent affordability restrictions is the
possibility for a cheaper long-term solution to ensure there is an
adequate supply of affordable housing. This approach could have the
added benefit of ensuring that at least some of that supply is in
improving or higher-opportunity neighborhoods.
Conversely,
permanent affordability mandates could increase development costs
and therefore reduce the number of affordable units being produced.
Such mandates could also result in affordable units only being
produced in areas experiencing no growth.
These conflicting
potential outcomes suggest that permanent affordability mandates
could improve housing affordability goals in some markets, and have
the opposite effects in others.
One clear takeaway is that policymakers should account for the
current and future value and benefits of affordability restrictions
when making approvals in the development process. When there is
public land, zoning variances, tax abatements, and actual dollars
going into developments, the public sector has significantly more
leverage in dictating the extent of such affordability mandates.
However, government subsidies are competing with private market
returns, which are based on investment risk and future values, and
affordability mandates need to account for this. In the end, there is
no hard and fast rule about when to apply permanent affordability
mandates to developments, but it is clear these mandates are a viable
tool that should be used to advance housing affordability goals.

